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Among the many promises of Barack Obama’s
2008 election campaign was a thorough reform
of U.S. healthcare. The radical inefficiency of the
existing system was obvious: although per-capita
healthcare costs were about twice as high as in
other industrialized countries, at least forty-six
million people still lacked health insurance and
forty-five thousand died each year as a result.1
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“Obamacare”) will not solve these
problems. The reform does contain some positive elements, most notably its subsidies to lowincome individuals, the extension of children’s
insurance to age twenty-six (assuming their
parents are already insured), and the ban on
insurance companies denying coverage based
on pre-existing conditions. But these improvements are embedded in a structure that preserves and consolidates a fundamentally flawed
system administered by private insurance corporations and populated by virtually unregulated for-profit providers.
The crux of the reform is the “individual
mandate” requiring everyone to purchase insurance from private companies or pay a fine, a
model that is far removed from a system of
genuine universal healthcare in which progressive taxation funds a government-administered,
single-payer insurance plan. This latter option,
often called “Medicare for All,” was never even
considered by Congress or the administration,
despite being far more efficient and humane
than the alternatives.2 Even a non-compulsory
government-run insurance program (the “public option”) was never seriously entertained in
the Senate.

Here we analyze the healthcare reform as an
illustration of the embeddedness of large corporations in U.S. policymaking. The affected
industries were centrally involved in the process from the start, guaranteeing that their interests would receive priority, while public opinion
and human rights considerations mattered little.
The creation of Obamacare offers a lens through
which to understand how and why the government embraces the class interests of the corporate elite.3 Yet the state is not just an instrument
of domination; it is also a site of struggle. After
reviewing the reform process, we offer some
strategic propositions for the Medicare for All
movement.

Public Opinion
Most press coverage of Obamacare has asserted
a deep ambivalence among the U.S. public. Yet
commentators have tended to ignore the reasons for the public’s lack of enthusiasm. In a
January 2010 CBS poll, for instance, 54 percent
disapproved of Obama’s “handling of health
care reform,” but large pluralities said the legislation did not go “far enough” in “covering
Americans” (35 percent), “controlling costs”
(39 percent), and “regulating health insurance
companies” (43 percent). Far fewer (32, 24, and 27
percent, respectively) thought the reforms went
“too far.” Approval ratings for Congressional
Republicans, who did not conceal their
contempt for working people and the uninsured,
were even lower than for Obama and the
Democrats.4

Many people who were wary of Obama’s
legislation would have supported a single-payer,
universal health insurance program, particularly
if it were presented as “Medicare for All.” In
polls spanning decades, a majority of the U.S.
public has consistently expressed a preference
for this sort of program, with a vast majority
agreeing that the government should guarantee
access to healthcare for everyone in the country.5 In a poll just before the 2008 election, 77
percent of all people (and even 57 percent of
those who planned to vote for Republican John
McCain) agreed that the government “should be
responsible for ensuring” that everyone’s “basic
need for healthcare” is met.6 In other words,
most of the public was far more progressive
than both the Republican Party and the mainstream of the Democratic Party.

While public opinion may have
played some role in getting
healthcare reform on the policy
agenda, it was marginal to the
policymaking process itself.
These figures refute the common assertion that
the public will drives healthcare policy.7 While
public opinion may have played some role in getting healthcare reform on the policy agenda, it
was marginal to the policymaking process itself.8

The Shaping of the Reform
Several factors likely contributed to the Obama
administration’s decision to pursue healthcare
reform in early 2009: the concern of business
sectors over ever-rising healthcare costs, health
insurers’ apprehension about the broader financial crisis, the intense public concern about
healthcare, and Obama’s desire to deliver on a
key campaign promise (and thus bolster his reelection chances and legacy).9 The exact weight
of each of these factors in the administration’s
initial decision is not entirely clear.
The subsequent process by which the reform
was shaped is much clearer: the administration

invited the key corporate power holders into the
policymaking process from the beginning. In the
words of White House communications director
Dan Pfeiffer, the Obama strategy was to “bring
every stakeholder to the table.”10 Journalist Ryan
Lizza makes clear that “stakeholder” referred to
capitalist interests and not the general public,
noting, for example, that Obama “sent his toughest political operatives—like Rahm Emanuel
and Jim Messina—to cut deals with the pharmaceutical industry and hospitals.”11
One major agreement that derived from this
process of negotiation promised the health
insurance industry tens of millions of new customers, who would be forced by the law to buy
plans from private insurers. In exchange, the
industry agreed to provide coverage to patients
with pre-existing conditions.12 In another major
negotiation, administration operatives and
Democratic Senator Max Baucus (Chair of the
Senate Finance Committee) gained assent from
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA) to the proposed law by
renouncing the government’s power to negotiate drug prices and import lower-cost drugs.13
The final product was generally deemed “a
good deal” by industry insiders (the opinion of the
senior vice president of PhRMA, which actually
bought ads supporting the bill).14 Except for the
five biggest private insurers (Aetna, Cigna,
Humana, UnitedHealth, and WellPoint), most
major players in the healthcare industry supported
the reform or at least did not actively oppose it.
This assent from the industry—a reversal of its
decades of vigorous opposition—resulted from
the shaping of the reform into a familiar form of
corporate welfare: “a big injection of public subsidy to expand the overall size of the U.S. healthcare market,” as the Financial Times noted.15
The corporate welfare aspect of the bill can
be clearly seen in the negotiations with
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the
main health insurers’ lobbying organization.
Though AHIP never formally endorsed the bill,
it agreed to the basic framework and did not
mobilize its legislative weight against it. The
law’s central component—the individual mandate in exchange for “no pre-existing condition
exclusions”—was precisely what AHIP and the
right-wing Heritage Foundation had previously

3
proposed, and which had been enacted (with
their consent) in Massachusetts under
Republican Governor Mitt Romney.16 This provision, in tandem with government subsidies
for low-income consumers, would assure a
huge infusion of profits into the health insurance industry, especially since consumers were
given no robust “public option.” To replace the
public option, yet another government subsidy
was added to the legislation: the creation of
government-financed exchanges that directed
consumers to private insurance, without the
insurers paying for the service.17
The insurance industry also shaped many
additional details of the legislation. Using their
influence within the Senate Finance Committee,
insurers substantially reduced the share of medical costs they would have been required to
cover under earlier proposals.18 A final feature of
Obamacare negotiated by AHIP was the virtual
abandonment of government rate regulation,
which is normally integral to governmentsubsidized services. The loose price regulations
in the final legislation—cost containment will
be essentially “voluntary”—were another result
of the process of bringing “every [corporate]
stakeholder to the table.”19

Using their influence within the
Senate Finance Committee, insurers
substantially reduced the share
of medical costs they would have
been required to cover under earlier
proposals.
With genuine cost containment forsaken,
contention during the legislative process came
to center around who was going to pay for the
cost increases (which are largely profit increases
for the healthcare industry). It was in this context that Obama administration political operatives sought to answer the demand of large
corporate employers for control of health insurance costs. Two elements in the legislation were
designed to transfer employer costs to their
workers. First, the non-profit, multi-employer
insurance plans that currently cover twenty million union workers (many of whom are temporary or seasonal) will be denied access to the

subsidies available to non-union employers on
the new healthcare exchanges; Obamacare
thereby creates an incentive for employers to
withdraw from these non-profit plans and force
their workers into for-profit plans run by private insurance companies, for which subsidies
are available. The non-profit plans that might
have been extended to cover the whole population are thus undermined by Obamacare.20
Second, the law will levy a special tax on the
higher-premium (and often higher-quality)
insurance plans vilified as “Cadillac” plans by
politicians. Starting in 2018, the increased tax
will give employers an excuse “for cuts [in coverage] they wanted to implement anyway” as
well as a strong incentive “to dump more costs
onto workers by offering lower-premium,
higher-deductible” (and higher co-pay) plans,
writes Jenny Brown of Labor Notes.21 Obama
personally intervened to preserve this tax in
January 2010, viewing it as an alternative to
increasing taxes on the rich.22

Obamacare creates an incentive for
employers to withdraw from nonprofit plans and force their workers
into for-profit plans.
Throughout the shaping of the law, the
Obama administration and Congressional leaders sought to construct legislation that answered
the needs of the key “stakeholders,” meaning
the corporate interests involved in or concerned
with healthcare. Faced with considerable conflicts among health insurers, pharmaceuticals,
hospitals, non-health industries, and other key
players, the Obama administration sought to
answer the pressing concerns of each, arriving,
in the end, with legislation that served the collective interest of the capitalist class.

Implementation as Class Struggle
The implementation phase of policymaking is
often just as important as the legislative phase.
Choices by the Executive branch (and in some
cases Congress) will determine the on-theground workings of the law and help decide
who will pay the rising costs of healthcare.

Since 2010, the corporate world has been able
to utilize its embeddedness within government
to win most of these battles.23 Consider, for
example, the failure of lobbying from organized
labor and other activists for temporary reprieve
from Obamacare penalties, which contrasts
sharply with the more accommodating posture
toward the petitions of the corporate elite.
Noteworthy examples of this class bias have
included the granting of a one-year delay for
major employers to insure all their workers—a
concession worth $10 billion to the affected corporations—and a two-year delay before the
dialysis drug Sensipar is subject to Medicare
price controls, which will transfer about $500
million to biotechnology giant Amgen.24
This pattern of accommodation highlights
the importance of the implementation phase of
policymaking as an arena of unending class
struggle, with powerful “stakeholders” most
frequently winning the battles over the application of the laws passed by Congress. Those
stakeholders have usually been corporate elites,
but ordinary people can become stakeholders,
too—a point to which we return later.

Mechanisms of Corporate
Influence
The example of healthcare reform challenges
theories that stress the responsiveness of the
U.S. state to its citizens25 as well as arguments
questioning corporate elites’ ability to work collectively to influence policy.26 The process
sheds light on the means by which powerful
corporate actors shape state policy. Corporate
influence derives from a host of mechanisms,
many of which are familiar:
•• Campaign finance: The key players in
the crafting of Obamacare were largely
dependent upon health industry corporations for election and re-election. Barack
Obama received $22.4 million in 2008,
and the health sector was his third-mostimportant source of corporate donors
(health industry donations alone were
thirty-two times greater than all labor
union contributions to Obama). The
twenty-three members of the Senate

Finance Committee (SFC) received
nearly $16 million in 2008 and $20 million in 2010. Since 2003, the Committee’s
Chair, Max Baucus, had received $3.4
million, or 23 percent of his total campaign donations; the minority leader,
Republican Charles Grassley, had
received $2 million. Committee members’ opposition to a “public option” that
would compete with private insurers
tended to correlate with donations from
the health industry over the previous two
decades.27 The structure of the electoral
process thus guaranteed the presence of
health industry loyalists in key
Congressional offices.
•• Lobbying: The healthcare industry
spends more money on lobbying than
any other, including nearly $1 million a
day on lobbying and campaign contributions during the 2009 debate.28 Many elements of the legislation were written
directly by lobbyists.

Many elements of Obamacare
were written directly by healthcare
industry lobbyists.
•• Politicians’ stock holdings: According to
a 2009 report, “Almost 30 key lawmakers” involved in drafting the legislation
“have financial holdings in the industry,
totaling nearly $11 million worth of personal investments.” Then-SFC member
John Kerry (D-MA) and his wife held “at
least $5.2 million in companies such as
Merck and Eli Lilly.”29 The personal
interest of key policymakers thus lay in
safeguarding and increasing the profits
of healthcare corporations.
•• Personnel transfers: The SFC, and Max
Baucus’s office in particular, exemplified
the personnel transfer or “revolving door”
between government and industry (Table
1). The most blatant example was Elizabeth
Fowler—who, as Senior Counsel to the
Committee, was the key professional
involved on the government side. Fowler
was previously a vice president at
WellPoint, one of the nation’s largest
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Table 1. The Revolving Door: Senator Max Baucus’ (D-MT) Ties to Healthcare Industry (Partial List).
Name

Position

Ties to health industry

Notes

Max Baucus

Chair of Senate Finance
Committee (SFC)

Three of five top donors in
2007-2012 were healthcare
or health insurance firms

Elizabeth
Fowler

Top aide to Baucus, Senior
Counsel to SFC, 20082010; previously Chief
Health and Entitlements
Counsel for SFC, 20012005

Received $253k in industry
donations in 2007-2010,
plus $201k in donations
from industry lobbyists in
2007-2009
Vice president for Public
Policy and External
Affairs, WellPoint
Insurance Co., 2006-2008

Michelle
Easton

Chief Health and
Entitlements Counsel for
SFC, 2005-2008

Jeff Forbes

Chief of Staff for Baucus,
1999-2002; Staff Director
for SFC, 2002-2003

Scott Parven Chief International Trade
Counsel for Baucus,
2003-2006

Helped write healthcare
reform bill passed by Senate
in March 2010; hired by
Obama in July 2010 as
Deputy Director of Office
of Consumer Information
and Oversight at HHS; later
hired by Johnson & Johnson

Former vice president
at PhRMA; since 2008,
lobbyist representing over
a dozen health firms
Lobbyist for HCR Manor
Care PAC, 2007-2012,
and for lobbying firm
hired by PhRMA, Merck,
HCR Manor Care, and
other health industry
firms, 2004-present
Director of Int’l Public
Policy for Aetna
insurance, 1998-2006;
lobbyist for Pfizer,
PhRMA, eHealth Inc.,
and other health industry
firms

Source. Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org); Glenn Greenwald, “The Revolving Door Spins Faster on
Healthcare Reform,” Salon.com, July 15, 2010, available at www.salon.com/2010/07/15/fowler_4; Fraser, “The Affordable
Care Attack,” 98.

private health insurance corporations.
After the reform became law, she was
appointed by President Obama to oversee
its implementation. The career of Fowler—
and many other key players—involved
moving back and forth between government service and the healthcare industry.
In addition to these familiar mechanisms of
corporate influence, there is also a less-talkedabout structural reason for the government’s
compliance with capitalist interests. Corporate
influence does not always require direct colonization of the state or overt bribes like campaign
contributions; capitalists also exercise power

by virtue of their structural control over the
economy on which the state is dependent and
through the structural constraints imposed by
government institutions themselves, which
have been shaped by past corporate influence in
ways that limit the freedom of individual politicians. Comprising 18 percent of national gross
domestic product (GDP), and linked to many
other industries through interlocking boards of
directors and other ties, health industry corporations contribute a substantial portion of the
tax base on which the government relies for its
revenues. They also employ large numbers of
constituents and collect taxes from their workers on behalf of the government. In effect, then,

the state is dependent upon both the profit levels
and the economic trajectory of the corporate
world. Politicians must pursue policies that
guarantee profits, even when such policies
undermine the overall well-being of the population or the economy as a whole. U.S. healthcare
firms thereby wield incredible power quite apart
from the more visible mechanisms of influence
identified above.30
All these factors contributed to the accommodationist approach (to corporate interests) of
the Obama administration and Congressional
Democrats. Politicians do have individual and
collective discretion, and it is often their personal interests and commitments that lead them
to favor capitalist interests. Even when they are
personally committed to progressive or anticorporate policies, however, the political structure and process may preclude such initiatives.
Having different politicians in Congress or having a more aggressive, more progressive president in the White House could have made some
difference, but even a Ralph Nader would have
been subject to many of the same constraints.

Medicare for All: What Will It
Take?
The extent of corporate embeddedness in the
policymaking process has important implications for movement strategy. Since politicians
are not actually the main authors of policy, targeting politicians may not be the most effective
way to change state policy. We instead propose
that, given the political power of corporations,
the most effective strategy for influencing state
policy is to threaten those corporations directly.
Doing so can mitigate their opposition to
reform, or even—if the threat is great enough—
compel them to support it.31
The dismal results of healthcare reform show
that the entire process of legislation and implementation needs dramatic, revolutionary overhaul. But in the absence of such structural change,
substantial segments of the corporate leadership
will have to come around to the idea of single
payer before it can happen. In the current U.S.
context, any progressive reform that stands to
negatively affect key business stakeholders will
fail unless its advocates can find a way to compel

support for the reform among major segments of
the corporate elite, either in the affected industries or elsewhere. In our view, movement energies are thus best spent targeting not politicians
but rather the real power holders in the political
process: the corporate elite, or—more broadly—
the capitalist class. The goal of the single-payer
movement should be to increase the financial
pressure on corporations to the point that they go
to the politicians and demand single payer.

Movement energies are best spent
targeting not politicians but rather
the real power holders in the
political process: the corporate elite.
This indirect path to government policy change
has been essential to some of the most important
reform struggles in U.S. history. The 1935 Wagner
Act guaranteeing private-sector workers the right
to unionize was only implemented after workers’
agitation threatened employers to the point that
they embraced union representation as a “lesser
evil” compared to workplace disruption. Similarly,
the economic damage that black activists inflicted
on segregated businesses was arguably a prerequisite for the enactment and implementation of civil
rights reforms in the 1960s. In both cases, activists
changed state policy not so much by targeting
politicians but by targeting economic power holders, who reluctantly accepted the changes desired
by the activists as a lesser evil option, and then
instructed their political representatives to do the
same.32
With regard to healthcare, we have no magicbullet strategy to offer but would propose that
the single-payer movement focus on building
labor-community alliances that can force corporations to absorb more of the costs of healthcare. If they are forced to bear these costs,
employers outside the healthcare industry may
decide to use their political influence on behalf
of single payer. There are any number of reasons why non-health-industry CEOs have not
already embraced single payer: their ties to the
healthcare industry, the desire to maintain a
powerful bargaining chip vis-à-vis their workers, the desire for leverage over the unemployed,
and perhaps in some cases ignorance or lack of
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long-term vision. But at some point employers—if their healthcare costs continue to spiral
upward—could decide that the benefits of single payer outweigh the costs. Employers today
are increasingly worried about healthcare
prices, meaning that an obstreperous movement
that forces them to bear more of those costs
could help tip their cost-benefit scales toward
the single-payer option.33 Workers inside the
healthcare industry—which still has relatively
high unionization rates—could also play an
important role. By shifting more costs onto
their employers (hospitals, clinics, nursing
homes, etc.), they may be able to turn these sectors of the industry against the health insurers.
Historically, there is a strong positive correlation between the strength of labor in a given
country and that country’s establishment of
national health insurance and other social welfare measures.34 Though weaker than in most
industrialized countries, U.S. labor unions have
been a major force advancing the interests of
the entire working class, not just their members.
Sometimes they help the broader working class
even without trying, by increasing wages and
benefits across the economy and impelling
employers to embrace government social programs. They have been most effective, however, when they have deliberately fought on
behalf of the broader working class and other
oppressed populations.35
Hundreds of U.S. union locals, twenty-two
internationals, and even the AFL-CIO have
endorsed single payer. However, the level of
commitment to the cause varies widely among
them, and many of those same unions were also
enthusiastic promoters of the Obamacare legislation.36 This disjunction reflects an insularity of
vision, reinforced no doubt by many unions’
accustomedness to their own employer-based
health plans. It also reflects most unions’ continued attachment to a strategy of building relationships with Democratic politicians and
avoiding confrontation with employers. But
unions can change, both through internal revitalization and through the healthy influence of
other mass movements.37 Non-union, community-based organizations can play a key role in
this struggle by organizing non-unionized workers and articulating a bold, progressive agenda

that pulls unions to the left. Vibrant grassroots
groups like the Vermont Workers’ Center and
Healthcare-NOW! have been leaders in this
regard, most notably in Vermont but in many
other states as well.
In addition to increasing the financial pressure on employers, a revitalized labor movement could simultaneously help to mobilize the
broader public around the single-payer agenda.
Unions like National Nurses United and professional organizations like Physicians for a
National Health Program have been at the forefront of the single-payer movement, helping to
educate union and non-union workers alike
about the benefits of single payer. A coherent
progressive counter-narrative and labor-community solidarity are both crucial, for the elite
targets of agitation will inevitably respond to
increased financial pressure by blaming workers and the poor and seeking to pit the nonunionized against the unionized.
A successful strategy in this case depends
upon building grassroots power while exploiting the vulnerabilities and inner divisions of the
corporate elite. A confrontational movement
structured around labor-community alliances
and oriented toward the needs of the entire
working class (nationally and globally) could
greatly accelerate the tipping of corporate leaders’ cost-benefit scales and, by extension, the
achievement of a civilized healthcare system.
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